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1. Introduction
The two principal ways by which people can reduce their health and safety risks are by
choosing safer activities or by taking additional precautions while engaging in a risky activity.
Seatbelt usage has been themost important natural experiment of individual selfprotection. A
substantial economic literaturehas analyzed the efficacy of seatbelts in promoting safety,1 the
desirability of using seatbelts from a benefit-cost standpoint,2 and the implications of seatbelt
use formaking inferences about an individual's willingness to bear health risks, or about the
implicit value of a statistical life.3Most studies suggest that, on balance, wearing seatbelts is
a safetyprecaution forwhich the benefits to the average individual exceed the costs.Whether
there

are

overall

self-protection

safety
on

the

benefits

to society

of care

level

remains

the driver

controversial,

however,

due

to the effect

of

uses.4

It has long been a policy concern that some individuals fail to perceive the benefits of
seatbelt usage. Informational campaigns can affect decision-making by helping people tomore
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1
See, among others, Peltzman (1975), Blomquist (1988), and Cohen and Einav (2003). Blomquist (2004) provides the
most detailed survey of analyses of protective behavior.
2
See Arnould and Grabowski
(1981) and Levitt and Porter (2001).
3
See Blomquist (1979), Winston
(1987), Blomquist, Miller, and Levy (1996), and Viscusi (1998).
4
Peltzman's (1975) offsetting behavior hypothesis acknowledges the theoretical possibility that safety innovations could
be negated by more aggressive driving habits so that the overall effect on safety is diminished. Similar results have been
Received March

found by Blomquist (1988) and others. However, Cohen and Einav (2003) found somewhat different results, as there
was no significant evidence of offsetting behavior for seatbelts in theirmodel after correcting for simultaneity.
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accurately perceive the risk reduction achievable by using seatbelts. However, the informational
campaign designed to foster seatbelt usage is perhaps the best documented failure of
government information efforts to alter behavior.5 The main lesson from this informational
failure is that reminderwarnings that do not provide new knowledge do not alter behavior. The
results presented here also suggest that theremay be no major information gap that should be
filled.
The focus of this paper is on the implied value of statistical life (VSL) based on seatbelt
usage and the consistency of those estimates with theVSL levels that the same sample reveals in
a stated

survey.

preference

In each

instance,

one

computes

the VSL

based

on

the tradeoff

rate

between the change in costs and the change in the risk, or
VSL

=

ACost/ARisk.

(1)

For the stated preference survey, the estimates of VSL are quite direct. Respondents consider
a policy option with a well-defined risk reduction and indicate themaximum value of ACost
that they are willing to incur to achieve that risk reduction.6
Our estimation of theVSL implied by seatbelt usage derives an imputed value using an
approach introduced by Blomquist (1979). Government estimates of seatbelt efficacy provide
thepertinent value forARisk. The value of ACost consists of three components: the time cost of
buckling up, the disutility cost of having one's range of motion restricted by the belt, and the
reduction in expected legal penalties from not buckling up in the presence of mandatory
seatbelt laws.7 Rearranging Equation 1, a person will choose to wear seatbelts if
ACost < VSL
For continuous fatality risk choices, theVSL
as shown inViscusi (1998).

x ARisk.

(2)

should be the same across various risk domains,

Overall, more than 75% of drivers use seatbelts. That all people do not use seatbelts all the
time,

however,

is not

necessarily

inconsistent

with

rational

behavior.

To

determine

the

rationality of the decision to use seatbelts on a particular tripwould require more information
on the costs of precautions and the likelybenefits, which will vary with contextual details such
as the type of vehicle driven, where the vehicle is driven, and how the vehicle is driven.
Although the available data do not enable us to resolve the question of whether seatbelt
usage decisions are rational, it is feasible to explore the consistency of these risk-taking
decisions across different domains. Consistent risk takers should display the same threshold
risk-cost tradeoff across different choices if these safety decisions are continuous. Because
seatbelt usage decisions are discrete, theremay be some observed VSL differences even ifpeople
are

5
6

being

consistent

risk

takers.

See Adler and Pittle (1984) for documentation of the failure of the "buckle up for safety" campaign.
Policymakers in theUK use stated preference VSLs, such as those developed by Jones-Lee (1989), to value traffic safety
policies. Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1991) develop stated preference values for traffic safety improvements in theU.S.

7
to these legal enforcement initiatives follow rational economic behavior. Cohen and Einav (2003) find that
Responses
usage rates increase when laws are imposed, with greater effects for primary enforcement than secondary enforcement.
Secondary enforcement means that citations for seatbelt nonuse are only issued after a motorist has been pulled over
for another offense, while primary enforcement allows law enforcement officers to stop a vehicle for seatbelt nonuse
In the revealed preference VSL calculations in Section 4, the legal penalty
even in the absence of another misdemeanor.
component will be assumed

to be de minimis

relative to the first two effects.

Automobile Seatbelt Usage and VSL

661

The first testof the consistency of seatbelt usage with risk-taking behavior is a comparison
of the stated preference VSL amounts with the estimated VSL range implied by seatbelt usage.

Meta-analyses such as Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Blomquist (2004) have made comparisons
across samples and across different studies,many of which involve different risk situations. The

unique feature of this study is that in addition tomaking comparisons toVSL estimates in the
literature,we also make within-sample tests that hold constant both the sample composition
and the risk context. Although some previous studies have generated both stated preference
VSL

amounts

and market-based

estimates,

these

studies

have

not used

this evidence

as a test of

the consistency of actual risk-taking decisions and stated preferences across individuals.8
The second consistency test thatwe report is the responsiveness of seatbelt usage rates to
the individual's stated VSL. Are people who have higher stated VSL levelsmore likely towear
seatbelts, as theory predicts? This article reports the first tests in the literature linking stated
preference

values

to self-protective

behavior.

We also examine other economic determinants of seatbelt usage to testwhether behavior is
consistent with cost-risk balancing. For example, people who have revealed themselves to be
risk takers by smoking cigarettes should be less likely to use seatbelts.9 In contrast,members of
demographic groups who more correctly perceive large health and safety risks, particularly
women and those with college or advanced degrees, should be more likely to use seatbelts.10
This paper provides comparisons within-sample and with respect to other revealed
preference estimates that focus primarily on traffic safety situations. As Dionne and Lanoie
(2002) have suggested, the VSL for transportation risks could differ from the VSL for job
fatality risks because the nature of the deaths may differ. These differences may not be

substantial, however, as Blomquist concluded that the VSLs based on revealed preference
consumption behavior and protective behavior "fall in the range of estimates based on averting
behavior in the labor market" (2004, p. 104). Both revealed preference studies and stated
preference studies have addressed trafficsafety risks, but not with respect to thewithin-sample
consistency of the estimates. Comparisons across studies in different risk contexts suggest that
levels in the literature implied by seatbelt usage decisions are comparable to or perhaps
a bit lower than the estimated VSLs in other contexts, such as labor market risks.11
theVSL

There have also been several stated preference estimates of theVSL for trafficsafety risks,
such as those by Jones-Lee (1989) for theUK and Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1991) for the
United States. Whereas Miller (2000) concluded that theVSLs derived from stated preference
approaches were higher than those from averting behavior, the survey inViscusi (1993) found
them to be similar inmagnitude to the estimates implied by labor market studies. Our study
8

Lanoie, Pedro, and Latour (1995) examined implied and stated VSL amounts as a test of the correspondence between
the two methodologies
rather than a test of market efficiency. In the same vein, Viscusi and O'Connor
(1984)
estimated the implicit value of statistical injuries using within-sample market data and survey data, but their concern

was with respect to performance of chemical labels, not the efficiency of risk-taking choices. The Lanoie, Pedro, and
Latour results for a Canadian
sample indicated significant difference inVSL amounts using the two approaches. The

labor market VSL amounts were only statistically significant for themanual unionized worker
subsample, making broader comparisons infeasible.
9
While
this relationship has been documented previously by Hersch and Viscusi (1998) using a national sample,
establishing a similar relationship for the sample analyzed here will provide a useful corroboration of both the
results for hedonic

relationship itself and the reasonableness of our sample results.
10
See Hakes and Viscusi (2004) for a more detailed analysis of mortality risk perceptions by demographic group.
11
Viscusi and Aldy (2003), Blomquist (2004), and Miller (2000) provide themost detailed reviews and comparisons
such studies.
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preference

a measure

to construct

approach

of

individual

risk preferences

that can be incorporated in an empirical model of seatbelt usage decisions.
Subsequent sections explore the interrelationships among different VSL amounts and
seatbelt usage. Section 2 presents an overview of the characteristics of our sample of 465 adults
and presents their stated preference VSL amounts. The effect of these VSL levels and other
variables on the probability of seatbelt usage is examined in section 3. In section 4, we derive
measures of VSL implied by the self-protective seatbelt usage behavior, and section 5 concludes.

2. Sample
As

Stated Preference VSLs

Characteristics:
2 indicates,

Equation

seatbelt

as a person's

increases

usage

and Seatbelt Usage
VSL

increases

and

is greater

if the person perceives a large reduction in risk. The focus of this section is on the probability
that an individual uses seatbelts and whether that probability responds to a stated preference
measure of VSL

and other variables in the expected manner.
To explore these issues, we use an original survey of 465 respondents undertaken in 1998
in Phoenix, Arizona. The main advantage of this data set is that ithas unique information on

amounts and risk beliefs that can be linked to seatbelt usage. Because only 90 people in the
sample do not use seatbelts, the sample size is relatively small, but nevertheless we find

VSL

significant effects for the key variables of concern. A marketing firm in Phoenix recruited
subjects through random-digit dialing and paid each $40 to come to a central location to fill out
a half-hour-long

survey

questionnaire

to a series

pertaining

of risk

issues.12

Although

one might

expect that people with a low opportunity cost of timewould be drawn to participate in the
survey, the average education level of respondents is above the average for Phoenix and for
Arizona generally.13 The sample reflects a broad cross section of society, but not a random
population, so it is important to control the estimates for differences

sample of the entireU.S.
in demographic
differences

Table
sample,

Because

characteristics.

in sanctions

for failure

the whole

to use

seatbelts

is drawn

sample
do

not

enter

from

a

single

city,

state

the analysis.

1provides thedemographic characteristics and VSL amounts for threegroups: the full

people

who

always

use

and

seatbelts,

those who

never

or only

sometimes

wear

seatbelts.14

On average, the sample is44.3 years old, has 14.6 years of schooling, is 10% nonwhite, and is 69%
female.
these

Subsequent
estimates

regression
to make

analysis

projections

controls
to a more

for these personal
representative

characteristics

population

so that we

can use

mix.

from respondents' expressed willingness to pay for
a reduction in their risk one-year of death due to an automobile accident.15 The wording of the
question is as follows:
The VSL

variable

is calculated

risk of death in a car crash by 1/10,000. Thus,
if there
you could reduce your annual
Suppose
were 10,000 people just like you, there would
be one less expected death per year in your group.
12
Overall, 493 people were surveyed, but 10 respondents did not answer the seatbelt use question and 18 others did not
give sufficientmortality risk perception responses, producing a sample size of 465.
13
Unfortunately, the survey did not include a wage or income question, making it infeasible to address the role of these
measures of opportunity cost.
14
The three possible responses for wearing seatbelts were "always," "sometimes," or "never."
15
The general approach of using a survey to elicit willingness to pay for safety is in the same vein as the stated preference
approach

to valuing traffic safety used by Jones-Lee

(1989) and Viscusi, Magat,

and Huber

(1991).

Automobile Seatbelt Usage and VSL
1. Summary Statistics, by Seatbelt Usage Group

Table

(Standard Error of theMean)

Mean

=
Female
Education (in years)
No high school diploma
High school diploma only
Some college
College degree (B.S, B.A)
Advanced degree
=
1
Nonwhite
Current smoker = 1
Value of statistical life
($ millions)a
Infinite

VSL

Samplesize 465

14.64(0.12)
[2.5]
0.037 (0.009)
0.181 (0.018)
0.406 (0.023)
0.269 (0.021)
0.108 (0.014)
0.095 (0.014)
0.226 (0.019)

42.5(1.8)
[16.6]
0.167(0.040)
0.411 (0.052)
0.244 (0.046)
0.589 (0.052)
13.70(0.22)
[2.1]
0.056 (0.024)
0.300 (0.049)
0.422 (0.052)
0.189 (0.041)
0.033 (0.019)
0.078 (0.028)
0.378 (0.051)

5.085 (0.244) [5.0]
0.090 (0.013)

5.345 (0.277) [5.1]
0.083 (0.014)

3.949 (0.484) [4.3]
0.122 (0.035)

375

Numbers in parentheses report standard errors about the sample mean
standard deviations of the continuous variables are in square brackets.
a
Table 3 describes the distribution of this categorical variable.
This
How

risk reduction
much

would

safety measures

would

People Who Sometimes or
Never Wear Seatbelts

44.8(0.8)
[15.0]
0.091(0.015)
0.387 (0.025)
0.400 (0.025)
0.709 (0.023)
14.86(0.13)
[2.5]
0.032 (0.009)
0.152 (0.019)
0.403 (0.025)
0.288 (0.023)
0.125 (0.017)
0.099 (0.015)
0.189 (0.020)

44.3(0.7)
[15.3]
18-240.105(0.014)
25-^4 0.391 (0.023)
45-64 0.370 (0.022)
1
0.686 (0.022)

(in years)

[Standard Deviation]

People Who Always
Use Seatbelts

All
Variable
Groups

Age

663

cut your annual

risk of death

90

to describe the sampling distribution. The

in a car crash

in half.

you be willing to pay each year either for a safer car or for improved
cut your motor-vehicle
that would
risks in half?

highway

This question consequently gives respondents two ways to think about the hypothesized
absolute probability reduction and the percentage risk reduction. Providing two

ARisk?the

such measures assists in elicitingmeaningful responses given the difficulties posed by the low
probabilities involved. Respondents chose from a range of responses: $0 to $50, $50 to $200,
$200 to $500, $500 to $1000, and above $1000. A final possible option was that respondents
could

indicate

that

their willingness

to pay

is "infinite?all

present

and

future

resources."

responses are inconsistent with private risk-taking behavior and suggest that the
respondent refused to answer the question in the spirit inwhich itwas asked. The 9% of the

Such

who

sample
other

indicate

an

infinite

value

do

not

appear

to be

extraordinarily

conscious

safety

in

respects.
In other

survey

contexts,

it is standard

to

treat

such

outliers

as

"protest"

responses

by

people who did not understand the survey or were not engaged in the particular survey task.
The evidence we present is consistent with this interpretation.To show the robustness of the
results,

we

also

analyze

them

as being

meaningful

responses.

For

the purposes

of summarizing

the sample characteristics in this section and the regression estimates in section 3, it is sufficient
to treat the infinite response answers as a categorical dummy variable group that is analyzed
separately.

The median respondent indicated a willingness to pay that implies a VSL of $2 million to
million.
This value is unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of the infiniteresponses. This
$5
VSL

range is consistent with other stated preference results for motor-vehicle

risks. For
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example, the survey by Jones-Lee (1989) found a VSL
while theU.S. survey by Viscusi, Magat, and Huber

for trafficsafety in theUK of $5 million,
(1991) found that people valued reduced
risks of automobile fatality at a median value of $3.6 million.16
The overall relationship between stated VSL amounts and seatbelt usage is consistent with

levels.As indicated inTable 1, the sample had an average
of $5.1 million, using themidpoints of the ranges for purposes of calculation.17
Seatbelt users have a stated VSL of $5.3 million, as compared to $3.9 million for those who
individual differences in stated VSL

stated VSL
sometimes

or never

than non-

VSL

wear

as compared

women,

seatbelts.

Of

to 58.9%

users

Seatbelt

or sometime-users.
of

those

are

those who

less

relatively

in the sample

who

always

or never

sometimes

wear

wear

an

to express

likely

seatbelts,

seatbelts.

infinite

70.9%

Seatbelt

are
users

aremore likely to be better educated, and much less likely to smoke, as smoking rates are 18.9%
users

seatbelt

among

and

37.8%

who

those

among

sometimes

or never

use

seatbelts.

Table 2 provides seatbelt usage rates conditional upon the demographic characteristics
indicated in the first column. Whereas 80.6% of sample respondents overall report that they
always use seatbelts, 83.4% of women always use seatbelts, as compared to only 74.7% of all
men. The means in our sample are in line with national seatbelt usage at the time.18 In
a National Highway Transportation SafetyAdministration (NHTSA) survey in 2000, therewas
a 79% nationwide usage rate.Men reported using seatbelts 74% of the time, and women used
seatbelts 84% of the time. These statistics are almost identical to our gender-specific usage

rates. The mean seatbelt usage rate is higher in our sample than in some previous studies due to
our oversampling of females and a positive time trend in usage, which is likely caused by
increasing legal penalties for failure to buckle up.
Table 2 shows that there are few nonwhites in our sample. This small number of nonwhites
no
is,
doubt, part of the reason why we find insignificantnonwhite coefficients in our regression
results reported in Tables 4 and 5. Other patterns in Table 2 are that the rate of seatbelt use
generally increases with age, and that people with more education use their seatbeltsmore often.
The education effecton seatbelt usage is expected, as more human capital correlates with higher
present values of lifetimewealth, which in turn increases willingness to pay for safety.
Two

differences

between

those who

always

use

are most noteworthy. Seatbelt wearers are more
gender
wear

differences
seatbelts.

in risk-taking

Cigarette

smoking

behavior.19

seatbelts

Second,

is an extremely

and

those who

never

use

seatbelts

likely to be female, which is consistent with
current

dangerous

smokers
personal

are

less

consumption

likely

to always

activity

that

is strongly connected with a variety of risky behaviors.20 Failure to use seatbelts consequently
reflects consistent risk-taking behavior.
16
All estimates are in year 1998 dollars unless otherwise indicated.
17
These calculations treat the top-coded range of "above $1000" as having a VSL of $15 million.
18
NHTSA
(2000, at Table 4) reports survey results from 1998, which are based upon a question very similar to ours. See
The usage rates in our
the report on http://www.nhtsa.dot.gOv/people/injury/research/SafetySurvey/index.html#Part2.
with ?-tests for the equivalence of
sample do not differ statistically from the national averages reported by NHTSA,
means formales and females yielding ?-statistics of 0.18 and -0.29, respectively. Cohen and Einav (2003) use a different
sampling strategywhich results in lower reported seatbelt usage rates both inArizona and nationally. Their estimated
seatbelt usage rates inArizona were three percentage points below the national average in 1998. They used several
data sources, including state highway observational data on selected highways.
19
See Hersch (1998) for a review of gender differences inwillingness to incur health and safety risks. For a meta-analysis
of gender and risk-taking behavior, see Byrnes, Miller, and Sch?fer (1999).
20
See Hersch and Viscusi (1998) and Viscusi and Hersch (2001) for statistics on smokers' risk taking, including their use
of seatbelts.
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2. Percentage of People Who Always Wear

Table

Demographic

Seatbelts, by Demographic
Mean

Observations

Group

All respondents

665

Group

Always Use Belts
(Standard Error of Mean)

465

0.806 (0.018)

146
319

0.747 (0.036)
0.834 (0.021)

420
44

0.802 (0.019)
0.841 (0.056)

105
360

0.676 (0.046)
0.844 (0.019)

17
84
189
125
50

0.706(0.114)
0.679 (0.051)
0.799 (0.029)
0.864 (0.031)
0.940 (0.034)

Sex

Male
Female
Race

White
Nonwhite
Smoking status
Current

smoker

Former

smoker

Education

or nonsmoker

level achieved

No high school diploma
High school diploma
Some college
College degree
Advanced degree
Age
18-24
25-44
45-64
65 and over

49
182

0.694
0.797
0.872
0.746

172
59

(0.067)
(0.030)
(0.026)
(0.057)

responses for this survey across the six possible
a sharp discontinuity in the responses by
to
We
also
draw
attention
categorical responses.
aggregating the quantifiable responses into two broad VSL ranges. Despite concerns in the
Table 3 presents the distribution of theVSL

contingent

Table

valuation

literature

3. Relationship

Respondent's Value of
Statistical Life ($ millions)

0 to 5.0
0.0

to 0.5

0.5 to 2.0
2.0 to 5.0
5.0 to 10.0 or higher
5.0 to 10.0
10.0 or higher
"Infinite?all present
and future
resources''

that respondents

may

tend

to overstate

willingness-to-pay

amounts

of Value of a Statistical Life to Seatbelt Use

Percentage of Sample
inVSL Range

Percentage of Individuals in Percentage of Individuals in
VSL Range Who Always
VSL Range Who Sometimes or
Wear Seatbelts
Never Wear Seatbelts
(Standard Error of Mean)
(Standard Error of Mean)

21.1
32.7
17.9
14.8

77.1 (2.6)
75.8 (5.3)
83.2 (3.6)
71.4(4.6)
88.8 (2.6)
89.2 (3.4)
88.4 (3.9)

22.8
24.2
16.8
28.6

9.0

73.8 (6.9)

26.2 (6.9)

58.3
14.2
23.0

(2.6)
(5.3)
(3.6)
(4.6)
11.2(2.6)
10.8 (3.4)
11.6(3.9)

N = 465. Paired two-tailed t-tests of the equality of seatbelt use among individuals in the $0 to $5.0 M range;
$5.0 M to $10.0 M range; and infinitevalue category gave the following results, assuming equal variances: $0 to $5.0 M
vs. $5.0 M to $10.0 M: t= 2.985,/? = 0.003; $5.0 M to $10.0 M vs. infinite value: t= 2.476,/? = 0.014; $0 to $5.0 M vs.
infinite value: t = 0.471, p = 0.638.
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Table 4. Estimates of the Stated Value
Tobit Models

of Statistical Life (VSL)

Ordered Probit
Coefficient?"Infinite"
Omitted (Standard Error)

Ordered

from Ordered Probit and

Probit

Coefficient?"Infinite"
Highest

(Standard Error)

Tobit Model?"Infinite"
Omitted

(Standard Error)

Age
18-24
-0.045
25-44
0.055
45-64
-0.012
Female
0.139

(0.226)
(0.162)
(0.164)
(0.112)

0.240
0.092
0.072
0.179*

(0.208)
(0.155)
(0.157)
(0.106)

0.205
0.175
0.247*
0.455**

(0.275)
(0.139)
(0.151)
(0.193)

-0.043
0.418
0.232
0.378

(0.876)
(0.632)
(0.639)
(0.436)

level

Education

No high school diploma
Some college

0.429
(0.289)
0.207
(0.150)
0.484*** (0.162)
0.502**
(0.207),

College degree
Advanced degree
Nonwhite
Current smoker
Tobit intercept

-0.207
-0.096

0.01

(Pseudo)i?2

(0.182)
(0.131)

-0.156
-0.008

0.01

(0.170)
(0.119)

0.796
0.640
1.800***
1.477*
-0.477
0.010
3.147

0.01

(1.130)
(0.577)
(0.623)
(0.807)
(0.702)
(0.506)
(0.709)

The VSL categories, in increasing dollar value, form the dependent variable for the ordered probit model. The
Tobit model corrects for the 68 observations in the top finite response category with censoring at a VSL of $10 million or
more. The Tobit coefficients presented indicate marginal changes in the latent variable.
*
Significant at 90% confidence level; two-tailed test
**
Significant at 95% confidence level, two-tailed test.
***
Significant at 99% confidence level, two-tailed test.

in surveys,21 over half of the sample is in the $0 to $5 million range of VSL amounts. The
percentage of respondents who always use seatbelts isnearly 12% higher forpeople with a VSL of
$5 million ormore than forpeople with a VSL of $5 million or less.22These results are consistent

from the standpoint of costs and benefits of seatbelt use; seatbelts represent a highly cost-effective
way of reducing mortality risks.23Whether seatbelt nonuse is rational has been a continuing
concern in the literature,24but in this sample, at least from the standpoint of valuation, there is
evidence of consistent risk-takingbehavior, as higher VSLs are linked to greater seatbelt usage.
Note that the respondents who express an infiniteVSL do not seem to reflect such a high
value of safety in their personal protective decisions. Their seatbelt use rate of 73.8% iswell
below the sample mean and is statistically similar to respondents with low stated VSLs. This
behavior suggests that this group of respondents either did not understand theVSL question or
were

not

attending

to the survey

task.

The VSL amounts display an invertedU-shaped relationship over the life cycle. This age
related pattern is consistent with theoretical predictions, such as those presented in Shepard and

(1984). The mean VSL rises from $4.59 million for people aged 18 to 24 to
$5.24 million for people aged 25 to 44, and $5.21 million for those aged 45 to 64, afterwhich
VSL declines to $4.41 million for those aged 65 and older.
Zeckhauser

21
See Adams (1995) for a general critique of such surveys.
22
The /-statistic for the difference in proportions test is 3.0, assuming equal variances.
23
See Arnould and Grabowski
(1981) and Levitt and Porter (2001).
24
Blomquist (1991) provides evidence that is generally in support of rationality in terms of risk competence.
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identify the determinants of an individual's stated value of statistical life,Table 4
shows three sets of results.The first two equations are ordered probit regressions estimating the
stated VSL category as a function of the demographic variables and smoking status. The first
To

equation omits the infiniteVSL respondents, while the second equation treats these as the
highest value responses. The dependent variable in the ordered probit models ranks categories
from highest to lowest willingness to pay, with "infinite value" as the highest ordered category

in the second model. The estimated cut points for the ordered probit model are omitted from
the regression output shown inTable 4, and the age category coefficients are estimated relative
to the omitted age category, which is for individuals who are 65 or older.
While
the VSL categories are fairly coarse, nevertheless there are

two significant
relationships with demographic variables in the ordered probit equation. Females state higher
VSLs at the 90% confidence level for the second model, which is consistent with other studies
on gender differences in risk taking.Also, the coefficients for the top two education categories
are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The stated VSL of a holder of an
advanced degree is expected to be higher than that of a four-year degree recipient, and the
expected VSL of an advanced degree holder is estimated in the firstmodel as $502,000 higher
than theVSL of an otherwise similar high school graduate.
The third equation in Table 4 is a Tobit regression correcting for the 68 observations in
the top finite response category with censoring at a VSL of $10 million. There are 353 responses
with finite noncensored values, each of which is treated as being at themidpoint of itsVSL
range. The Tobit coefficients presented indicate marginal changes in the latent variable.25
In addition to confirming the qualitative results of the ordered probit models, the Tobit
resultsmake itpossible to predict themean estimated VSL for the sample, where thisprediction
is done on an individual basis and then averaged across the entire sample. This mean predicted
VSL amount is $4.6 million and will serve as one of the benchmarks in assessing the consistency
of seatbelt use with individual risk preferences.

3. Seatbelt Use Regression

Estimates

Equation 2 indicates that seatbelt usage should be greater for people who express a high
VSL and for those who believe that using seatbelts will greatly reduce risk.Although the survey
did not include a directmeasure of perceived risk reductions, itdid include a series of questions
eliciting a wide variety of mortality risk beliefs. The general approach follows that of
Lichtenstein et al. (1978), which has been a well-established benchmark for exploring how
people

assess

mortality

risks.26

The

mortality

risk perception

component

of

the

survey

asked

respondents to estimate the total numbers of people who died in a recent year in theUnited
25
Alternatively, we tested a selection-corrected Tobit model which predicts the 42 responses of "infinite'' VSL with
a probit regression. Instruments used in the first stage include responses to two other damage compensation questions
in the survey instrument, the current smoker indicator, and the intercept from the respondent's individual mortality

equation. As the inverseMills ratio selectivity bias term was not statistically significant, we do not
those
results
here. The results do not differ qualitatively.
report
26
It should be emphasized that itmay not be fully rational for people to invest the time and effort to become fully
risk perception

informed about risks of littlepertinence to them, but the overall responsiveness of their risk beliefs to a wide variety of
causes of death does provide a measure of the general accuracy of their risk beliefs.
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23

various

causes

of death.

To

provide

a

reference

point

for

the

risk

assessment, each respondent was told the total number of people?about
47,000?in theUnited
States who had died in automobile accidents in that reference year, which is the standard
anchor that previous studies of risk beliefs have given to respondents.
The measure thatwe use to characterize the responsiveness to risk beliefs is the elasticity of
risk beliefs with respect to actual mortality risk levels.How much do perceived risks change in
response to changes in the objective risks? People with more elastic risk perceptions should be

more likely to use seatbelts than people with less elastic perceptions, since theywill assess a greater
ARisk in response to the reduction in actual risk levels associated with seatbelt usage. The
empirical strategy for constructing thesemeasures is based on estimations of individualmortality

riskperception curves. For each respondent /we estimated a risk assessment equation of the form
ln(Perceived Risks/)

= a? +
bf ln(Actual Risks/).

(3)

The slope coefficient bt is the estimate of the risk perception elasticity with respect to actual
risks.28

These individual regressions are based on person-specific data sets of 23 data points, where
each observation represents the respondent's assessed number of fatalities due to a particular

ailment.29Due to the relatively large standard errors associated with regressions containing 21
or fewerdegrees of freedom, the point estimates for the elasticity are imprecise.Rather than use
the point estimates from the riskperception regressions directly,we have chosen to characterize

each individual's mortality risk perceptions by quartile, using 0-1 variables to indicate whether
the estimate of the risk perception elasticity was in the top quartile or bottom quartile of the
sample,

so as

to isolate

the qualitative

effects

of extreme

values

for

that

characteristic.

The binary elasticity variables will capture extremely high and low values of bh and will
serve to indicate individuals in the top and bottom quartiles of elasticity of risk perceptions
with respect to changes in actual risk. Individuals with larger values for b? in Equation 1will

perceive a large ARisk and should accordingly be more willing towear their seatbelts to reduce
fatality risks. The opposite is the case for people with low risk perception elasticities.30
Table
four models.

5 presents the probit estimates forwhether the respondent always uses seatbelts for
The

coefficients

reported

have

been

to correspond

transformed

to the marginal

variables and the two constructed

probabilities of usage. Models 1 and 2 include only theVSL
variables for the elasticity of risk perceptions. Models 3 and 4 also include a series of personal
background variables. Models 1 and 3 include VSL as a continuous variable, whereas Models 2
and 4 include the categorical VSL values, omitting the lowestVSL group ($0 to $0.5 million) to
serve as a baseline. Side by side, the fourmodels
the various
27

show that our results are quite robust across

specifications.

For a list of these causes, see Hakes

and Viscusi

(2004), which details the correlation ofmortality risk perceptions with

characteristics.

demographic
28
The a? intercept terms across individuals had a mean of 4.283 for those individuals used in our analysis, with an
average standard deviation of 2.281. The mean b? elasticity coefficient across individuals was 0.475, with a standard
deviation of 0.201.
29
A small number of respondents refused to estimate fatalities from one or more ailments, so that some of these

individual regressions are based upon fewer than 23 observations. Individuals assessing fatalities from fewer than 10
ailments were dropped from the analysis.
30
If, however, responses at these extremes reflect irrational responses to riskmore generally, one would have somewhat
seatbelt use is rational, extreme responses
different predictions. Assuming
correlated with failure to always use seatbelts.

that are

irrational would

tend to be
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1 through 3 in Table 5 show that, consistent with the central theoretical
prediction, respondents who have higher statedVSLs are more likely to always wear seatbelts.31
As an example, using the point estimate of theVSL coefficient fromModel 3, people stating
Models

a VSL

of between $5 million and $10 million have a 3.2% greater likelihood of always using
seatbelts than people stating a VSL between $2 million and $5 million.32 Interestingly, those
who refused to name any finite price for being willing to bear fatality risks are not significantly
more likely to use seatbelts. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that those responses
reflect a failure to be engaged in the survey task rather than an underlying risk attitude.
The elasticity of perceived risks with respect to actual mortality risk levels indicates
a constructive role of risk beliefs. Respondents forwhom the slope of the relationship between

ln(Perceived Risks) and ln(Actual Risks) is in the top quartile have a steeper risk belief curve
and are more likely to assess the risk reduction effectsof seatbelts as being substantial. Those in
the top risk perception elasticity quartile are almost 10% more likely to always use seatbelts.
The dummy variable indicating the bottom elasticity quartile is not statistically significant.
The

variables

demographic

as

perform

expected.

Females

are more

likely

to use

seatbelts,

is consistent with their lower rates of risk-taking behavior in other contexts. Better
educated respondents will have higher levels of lifetimewealth, which should lead them to be

which
more

safety conscious, but this influence is captured in part by the VSL variable. Similarly,
while better educated people are more knowledgeable about risk, this effect is reflected at least
in part by the series of risk belief variables. Better educated people also have a higher
opportunity cost of time,decreasing the incentive to use seatbelts. On balance, however, there is
a positive effect of education on seatbelt usage.
The

negative

smoking

status

effects

are

of particular

interest.

Smokers

incur

considerable

smoking-related fatality risks and engage in a wide variety of other risky behaviors.33 That
smokers are 12% less likely to always use seatbelts, controlling for all other factors, is reflective
of these differences in attitudes toward health and safety risks.

4. VSLs

as Revealed

through Seatbelt Use

The preceding analysis used the respondents' stated risk premiums for automobile
to examine

whether

the person's

expressed

VSL

levels

were

consistent

with

seatbelt

safety
use.

In

contrast, themajority of the previous literature uses seatbelt use decisions to infer revealed
preference VSLs for some population. Here we will examine the VSL amounts implied by
seatbelt use to see whether they are consistent with the stated preference values.
The Appendix details how we calculate the VSL derived from seatbelt usage decisions,
using estimates of the risk reduction due to seatbelt use, the time and discomfort costs of
seatbelt use, and information on the individual's seatbelt usage decision. These calculations
introduced in Blomquist (1979).

follow the approach
31
Although

theVSL category coefficients inModel 4 are not statistically significant, the point estimates follow the same
and
pattern
approximate magnitudes as inModel 2. The insignificance is largely attributable to the larger standard
errors resulting from reduced degrees of freedom in the regression.

32
At first glance, thismay not seem like a large increase, but given the high prior levels of seatbelt use, a 3 percentage
point increase from 80% usage to 83% usage reduces the proportion of nonusers by 15%.
33
See Hersch and Viscusi (1998) and Viscusi and Hersch (2001), who link smoking and seatbelt usage to thewillingness
to incur job risks.
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Table

6. Estimated VSLs, Using Blomquist

Disutility Value

(1979) Method

Used Mean

Low End of Range

High End of Range

$1.91 million
$7.62 million

$2.64 million
$8.36 million

$2.32 million
$8.03 million

$265 (Blomquist 1979)
$1012 (Winston 1987)
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The mean stated VSL from the seatbelt use survey, conditional upon giving a finite response, was $5.03 million,
with a 95% confidence interval for themean ranging between $4.56 million and $5.51 million.

We generate two sets of estimates, based on whether we assume a high level of disutility costs
of $1012 annually or a low level of disutility costs of $265. The impliedVSL estimates, shown in
Table 6, are well within the generally accepted ranges forVSL. Several referencepoints are useful
in assessing the reasonableness of theVSLs implied by seatbelt usage. The first trafficsafety study
to estimate VSL from people's self-protection decisions was Blomquist (1979), who estimated
a VSL of $0.9 million. Blomquist, Miller, and Levy (1996) made subsequent estimates using three

differentsets of assumptions, generatingVSL amounts ranging from $2.0 million to $9.3 million.
These estimated VSLs implied by seatbelt usage are broadly consistent with market evidence in
a wide variety of contexts. The literature survey by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) found a median VSL
inmarket situations of $6.6 million, with many estimates from the labor market and product
market being similar to those implied by seatbelt usage.
Other revealed preference evidence for trafficsafety risks can be derived from hedonic price
equations relating automobile prices to their respective fatality risks. Based on that approach,
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1990) derived VSL estimates of $4.8 million to $6.3 million, while
Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995) estimated a range from $3.6 million to $5.1 million.
Purchases of child safety seats also reveal a motor-vehicle riskVSL. These deaths are not
comparable to the risks to adults, but the estimates involve protective behavior and are based
on estimation approaches similar to the seatbelt analysis. Carlin and Sandy (1991) estimated
theVSL associated with child safety seats as $1.0 million, while Blomquist, Miller, and Levy
(1996) estimated a range from $3.5 million to $6.2 million.
In

to values

addition

from

the

there

literature,

are

several

instructive

within-sample

mean stated VSL

respondent has a stated VSL of $2 million to $5 million. The
is $5.1 million for the sample, excluding the infiniteresponses. The projected

Tobit

controlling

reference points. The median
estimates

$4.6 million. These
estimates

for

the

infinite

values

as

a

sample

selection

issue

average

sample-specific values are all consistent with the observed range of VSL

in meta-analyses

of external

market

reference

points.

Our estimates based on the lower level disutility costs of $265 per year from Blomquist
(1979) yield a mean implied VSL of $2.32 million, with individual estimates ranging from

$1.91 million to $2.65 million. These "low" estimates are very similar to themedian statedVSL
(1987) high disutility cost estimate of $1012 per year is used instead,

amounts. When Winston's
the mean

$7.62

implied VSL
to

million

estimate is $8.03 million, with
million.

$8.36

These

values

are

individual estimates ranging from

similar

very

to

the median

meta-analysis

estimates. Roughly one-third of all respondents have stated VSL values in the high VSL
as 18% have VSL amounts from $5 million to $10 million, and 15% have a stated VSL

range,
above

$10 million.
Comparing
VSL
on

also
giving

reveals
a

the computed implied VSLs
strong

response

$0.24 million. The

similarities.

other

than

In our
"infinite

to themean and confidence interval of the stated
survey

value"?is

sample,
$5.09

the mean
million,

stated
with

95% confidence interval for the conditional mean

VSL?conditional
a

standard

error

of

level of stated VSL
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amounts, from $4.56?$5.51 million, lies entirely within the computed VSL
$8.36 million implied by seatbelt usage decisions.

range of $1.91

5. Conclusion
Seatbelt usage decisions implyvalues of statistical lifeand provide evidence that theseVSL
levels are consistent with stated risk-cost tradeoffs. People with high VSLs should be more

likely to use seatbelts. The VSL amounts obtained from stated preferences for one aspect of
automobile safety are positively correlated with seatbelt usage and are comparable to this
survey's estimate of the VSLs revealed through the respondents' observed behavior. The
estimates for the revealed VSL amounts from seatbelt use bracket the stated preference VSL
amounts for this sample. This result provides evidence of themutual consistency that rational
decision makers should have between stated willingness-to-pay values for safety and revealed

preference values based on actual risk-taking decisions. The revealed preference VSL
are

also

similar

to those

in other

derived

amounts

contexts.

market

Other determinants of seatbelt use are consistent with rational choice as well. People with
risk beliefs that are very elastic with respect to actual riskswill be more likely to use seatbelts, as
theory
also

predicts.

perform

variables

Demographic
in the expected

such

as

education,

gender,

and

current

smoking

status

manner.

Appendix:CalculatingVSL Impliedby SeatbeltUsage
The established framework for estimating VSL amounts from seatbelt usage decisions is articulated by Blomquist
(1979) and Blomquist, Miller, and Levy (1996). We adapt this framework to introduce possible financial penalties
imposed by law enforcement officials and insurance companies and to allow for subjective risk perceptions which differ
from objective risk levels.
We formulate a person's

expected utility level (Z) associated with precautionary
Z =f(V,I,S,D,M),

where V =

behavior

as

(Al)

/=

= the level of
implicit value of life,
implicit value of an accidental injury, S
safety precaution taken (here
a 0-1 decision to use seatbelts), D = the nonmonetary level of physical discomfort from wearing a seatbelt while driving,
and M = the amount of monetary cost due to noncompliance with seatbelt laws through fines, and potentially through
insurance rates.

The marginal expected utility with respect to seatbelt usage will depend upon the perceived reductions inmortality
and injury risks from using seatbelts, the time and discomfort costs of seatbelt usage, and the likelihood of being caught
while not wearing one's seatbelt. Based on the prior analyses, the first-order condition for undertaking a precautionary
safetymeasure

(that is,with respect to S),
PV

-Wk)-=

taken at themeans

+ R'l

+ LM-

of all variables, and after rearrangement of terms, is

awt -

(D'/X)

R
B'
m

,Ar,

where P' =

the perceived marginal reduction inmortality risk,R' = the perceived marginal reduction in injury risk, L =
likelihood of incurring financial cost F conditional upon seatbelt nonuse, a = a factor converting work
hour wages tomonetary value of leisure hours, w = thewage rate, t= the time spent on the safety precaution, D' = the
= the
= the
marginal nonpecuniary disutility of undertaking the safety precaution, X
marginal utility of money, ?*,
=
the overall probit score where the probit results pertain to the probability of using
probit coefficient on wages, and B
seatbelts.
the perceived

We have defined P' and R' as changes in perceived risks rather than changes in actual risk. How strongly risk
perceptions P and R respond to the chosen level of precautions such as seatbelt use will affect the optimal level of
precautions. If this relationship isweak and risk beliefs P and R are not greatly affected by greater safety-related efforts,
precautions will appear

to be ineffective, and a low level of precautions will be desired.
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To facilitate the computations of VSL for the traditional range of disutility costs, and tomaintain comparability to
the previous literature,we also adapt several parameter estimates from Blomquist, Miller, and Levy (1996), who drew on
several outside sources. For instance, they assume t is 4 seconds per trip times 1504 trips/year, or 1.67 hours/year, and
that a = 0.6. They use federal highway survey data to estimate that / = 0.0315 V, and that R' = 12.145P'. Using those
statistical relationships, they collapse P' V and RT into one term in two parameters while solving for V.
Blomquist (1979, p. 546) uses the parameter estimates from his probit model of observed seatbelt use to calculate
themodel at the hypothetical point where the probability of buckling up is near 1.00 (Pbuckie= 0.99, so that B = 2.326),
and assumes that at that point Us = 0 so that the termwill drop out. He is then able to solve for a lower bound on the
average V using just the average wage rate and the ?* term from the probit regression.
The complete list of parameters used in the Blomquist model, and the assumptions we use to construct our VSL
introduced are made so themodel will be applicable to
estimates, is presented inAppendix Table A. The modifications
our survey context. For instance, using the context of the survey question on willingness to pay for risk reduction,
wherein the probability of a fatal accident was reduced by 1 in 10,000, we set P' at 0.0001.
Nonetheless, we retain several of the original assumptions. For instance, we accept that the ratio of mortality risk
reductions to nonfatal injury reductions has remained unchanged, and we use Blomquist's value of 0.382. Similarly, we
use Blomquist's values of 0.6 for a and 1.67 hours/year for t.
A key component of the analysis is the annual disutility cost of using seatbelts. Estimates for disutility are on the
order of hundreds of dollars. Blomquist (1979) estimated this value at $265 (1998 dollars). Winston
(1987) estimated
into 1998 dollars), which seems high, as Blomquist (2004) noted. We use these
disutility costs as $1012 (CPI-adjusted
estimates as hypothetical upper bounds and lower bounds on disutility costs. This method will, of course, abstract from
some individual differences in VSL across the sample, since we are assuming the disutility costs to be identical for
individuals, but still allows us to obtain a sense of the range of individual VSLs.
Since Blomquist's initial article, passage of mandatory seatbelt laws and primary enforcement laws has added an
consideration in seatbelt use decisions. The expected penalties paid through failure to use seatbelts would
appear as a positive term in the numerator of Equation 2, and would be equal to the average fine paid when caught times

additional

the expected number of tickets received per year. Our sample was drawn fromArizona in 1998. In that year Arizona had
secondary enforcement laws in place. Cohen and Einav (2003) report that the implementation of secondary enforcement
in 1991 temporarily raised seatbelt usage from 55% to 65%, but that by 1998, usage had fallen back to 62%, indicating
that the law was not a significant deterrent to nonuse. Consequently,
for ease of estimation we assume that LM is
sufficiently near zero to disregard that term in themodel.34
Although our survey did not collect wage or income data, it did obtain responses for age, education, gender, and
race, all of which are significant determinants of wages. Using the values of those demographic characteristics, we impute
wages for our sample respondents. To convert demographics into an estimated wage, we take wage and demographic
data from the 1998 Current Population Survey's March Demographic
supplement and run separate log-wage regressions
formales and for females. We restrict each regression sample to full-time civilian workers living inmetropolitan areas of
theMountain

census region.35 The coefficients from thewage regression are applied to our survey respondents to impute
level.

each person's wage

34
A hypothetical average fine of $50 and one expected ticket per year would decrease themarginal VSL required to
decide to use seatbelts by about $360,000. Estimating the perceived risk of being caught over an annual period,
however, is problematic. Periods of heightened enforcement, such as "Click it or ticket" programs over holiday
weekends, can temporarily raise the perceived number of tickets received at an annual rate by a significant amount,

perhaps to higher than 1.0. It is thus possible to argue both that during "business-as-usual"
periods of traffic
enforcement, when the probability of being caught is very low, the expected penalties are not high enough to
encourage universal seatbelt use and have negligible effects, and also that periods of heightened enforcement can be

effective at temporarily increasing seatbelt usage.
Sensitivity tests comparing the coefficients from theMountain
region sample to that of Arizonans find very similar
coefficients, but much higher standard errors with the smaller group. The regression formales, based on a sample of
1964 observations, explains 29.84% of the variation in log-wages, with an F-statistic of 84.5. The estimated equation is
= 0.540 + 0.087 AGE - 0.000836 AGE
0.263 BLACK
0.202 HISPANIC
0.122
LN(WAGE)
SQUARED
ASIAN
0.188 AMERICAN
+ 0.129
INDIAN OR PACIFIC
ISLANDER
0.353 HIGH
DROPOUT
SCHOOL

35

SOME

COLLEGE

+ 0.362 COLLEGE
+ 0.632 GRADUATE
GRADUATE
= 0.410 + 0.077 AGE
0.000789 AGE
0.257 AMERICAN
INDIAN OR PACIFIC

1,454 females is LN(WAGE)
HISPANIC
0.116 ASIAN
DROPOUT

+ 0.129 SOME

COLLEGE

+ 0.427 COLLEGE

GRADUATE

SCHOOL.
SQUARED
ISLANDER

The estimated equation for
0.210 BLACK
0.226
SCHOOL
0.280 HIGH

+ 0.599 GRADUATE

SCHOOL.
Only
are statistically insignificant at
the 95% confidence level. The omitted baseline group iswhite male high school graduates. Recent literature by Altonji
and Blank (1999) and Jarrell and Stanley (2004) concludes thatHeckman corrections for selection into the labor force
the coefficients for ASIAN

and AMERICAN

INDIAN

do not greatly improve the quality of estimation

inmore

OR

PACIFIC

ISLANDER

recent labor market data.
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In order to obtain an estimated slope coefficient forwage, the imputed wages were included in a probit regression
of seatbelt use alongside the female indicator and educational attainment variables and the respondent's risk
perception indicators, resulting in a probit coefficient of 0.037.36

model

Gathering

together the estimates into Equation

4 we solve for Vf.

0.0001382K/W

-

??K)

Wj

-

265

ft, (A3)

and
?/ ?
+ w? +
V i,low

0.0001382

265

(A4)

The equations for the VL highestimates differ only in using the annual disutility cost of $1012 instead of $265 as the
final term in the numerator. Both models are parameterized so that the predicted VSL increases by $14,614 for each $1
increase in estimated wages. Using the 10th and 90th percentiles of wages in theCPS March Demographic
Supplement at
$5/hour and $30/hour creates computed VSLs which vary by more than $365,000, even when holding disutility costs
constant. Finally, the responsiveness of stated VSLs to imputed wages is positive, with a point estimate of $74,939, but
given the large standard error associated with thewage estimation, this result is not statistically significant. As the stated
VSL question asked for a categorical response, a traditional correlation coefficient between stated VSL and estimated

wage is not appropriate, but an ordered logit regression resulted in a positive coefficient for estimated wage, although it
is significant only at the 75% confidence level. This result is consistent with the regression estimates inTable 4, which
show little correlation between the stated VSLs and the demographic variables.

36
As

are a linear combination of the demographic variables, the least statistically significant
variables, race and age, are omitted from themodel. As a test of robustness, various combinations of the
demographic variables were included in the probit regression, but the wage coefficient remained fairly stable in the
range 0.28-0.48. The respondent's stated VSL was omitted from thismodel, as the point of this exercise is to test the
the imputed wages

demographic

reliability of those responses.

Automobile Seatbelt Usage and VSL
Table A. Values Used
Variable
P'
V
R'
I

in Estimation of Revealed VSLs Using Blomquist
Value

Description

Marginal reduction inmortality
risk
Value of statistical life
Marginal reduction in injury risk
Value of injury prevention
Fudge factor converting work
hour

value

to leisure

hour

(1979) Method

used

Source

0.0001

Survey question context

12.145P'
0.0315 V
0.6

Blomquist
Blomquist
Blomquist

(1979)
(1979)
(1979)

value

Individual specific,
based on demographic

rate

Wage
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1998 Current
Population

Survey

variables

Time spent on the safety
precaution

M

Perceived annual number of
times caught for nonuse
Monetary penalty for seatbelt
nonuse, conditional upon being

Blomquist

Jointly considered de
minimis, based on

Cohen and Einav (2003)

Arizona

seatbelt

usage

law,

and

small

magnitude relative toD'
$265 and $1012
Blomquist
for ratio (D'IX)
Winston

(1979) and
(1987),
respectively

Marginal nonpecuniary disutility
of undertaking the safety
precaution

K

Marginal utility of money
Probit coefficient on wages

B

Overall probit score

X

(1979)

before and after 1991

caught
D'

1.67 hours/year

0.0367

Auxiliary

regression,

using 1998 Current
Population Survey
and

Individual specific,
as estimated earlier

Survey

survey

responses

responses
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